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Urban Policy: Does Political Structure Matter?
DAVID R. MORGAN
JOHN P. PELISSERO
University of Oklahoma

An interrupted time-series quasi-experiment is employed to test the basic hypothesis that reformed
cities (with city manager, at-large elections, and nonpartisan ballots) tax and spend less than
unreformed communities. Eleven cities with populations of 25,00() and above which significantly
changed their political structure between 1948 and 1973 are compared with 11 matched control cities
that made no changes. We found that over an II-year period, variations in fiscal behavior were virtually unaffected by changes in city g~vernment structure.

Among scholars of state and local government,
the question is still debated: do politics and
governmental structure have any independent influence on policies? Although much state-level
research suggests the answer is clearly yes, considerably less agreement exists for the local level.
Most research directed toward this issue at the urban level has probed the political effects of
reformed institutions. Presumably urban
reformers, who sought to replace the political machine with good government devices, sought certain policy goals as well. Just what those goals
were and how successful these groups have been
in acheiving them remains unsettled. Some argue
that one of the consequences of the reform movement's "public-regarding" ethos was to provide
greater support for spending on community-wide
public improvements. Others disagree. They contend that cities with reform institutions tend to be
less responsive to their socioeconomic environments, which presumably causes such
municipalities to be less sensitive to the higher
spending demands of lower-income and minority
interests. The result, according to the latter argument-lower levels of taxing and spending. Thus
the issue for local government remains unsettled.
The argument over the political consequences
of urban reform has been clouded by several
methodological disputes. One of the most important relates to time order. For example, Lineberry
AND Fowler (1967, p. 707) insist that one wellknown analysis of the reform movement's effect
on city government structure (Wolfinger and

We would like to acknowledge Richard Bingham,
University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee, for suggesting the
need for a study of this sort. Robert England deserves
special thanks for his valuable assistance in managing
and processing the data. Bruce Kennedy helped with the
data gathering and coding as well. Finally, we are greatly indebted to Kenneth J. Meier, University of Oklahoma, whose methodological help has been invaluable.

Field, 1966) is flawed in a causal sense because obvious time order assumptions are violated; independent variables (census data) are used to explain decisions (government structure) made at an
earlier period. Yet none of the research on this
topic systematically includes a time element; it has
all been cross-sectional in design. The research
reported here offers a different approach-a timeseries analysis-in an effort to shed further light
on this basic question.

Public Policy Implications of Municipal Reform
One of the most pervasive themes concerning
the effect of municipal reforms derives from the
public-regarding thesis first proffered by Banfield
and Wilson (1963; p. 46). According to these
authors, certain subcultural groups within the city, constituted on ethnic and income lines, sought
a more rational, efficient, and honest city government. These groups presumably based their
political preferences on some conception of the
public interest as a whole in contrast to a more
narrow ward or neighborhood orientation. As a
principal means of promoting these goals, such
public-regarding groups pushed the "good
government" agenda of municipal reforms. Such
institutional arrangements as council-manager
government, nonpartisan ballots, and at-large
elections seem entirely consistent with the commitment of these groups to minimizing partisanship and particularism in favor of the universal
values of the larger community.
The public-regarding ethos had other political
results as well. A concern for the larger whole,
according to Banfield and Wilson, might lead to
support for various community-wide projects and
improvements. Indeed, Wilson and Banfield
(1964) show that certain putatively publicregarding groups tended to vote against their selfinterest, narrowly conceived, in favor of expenditure proposals that would raise their taxes.
Others (Boskoff and Zeigler, 1964, pp. 46-47;
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Uyekf, 1966) find a similar association between
upper-status groups and support for bond elections for municipal improvements. Thus the
causal sequence is complete-an upper-middle
class public-regarding ethic should yield two
results-municipal reforms and greater expenditures for public improvements.
This line of reasoning has not been so obvious
to many. In fact, the whole public-regarding ethos
has been rather severely challenged. Hennessey
(1970) avers that the approach is not a genuine
theory and, further, that it was tested with aggregate voting statistics although it was clearly
applicable only to individual voting behavior.
Others have failed to find evidence to sustain the
ethos hypothesis (Wolfinger and Field, 1966;
Bowman, Ippolito, and Levin, 1972; Duran,
1972). Miller and Bennett (1974) even insist that a
subsequent effort at revisiting the ethos formulation by Wilson and Banfield (1971) contains a
serious methodological flaw that disproves the
whole concept.
Despite the problems associated with the ethos
notion, the most widely referenced study on the
effects of reforms on city fiscal behavior begins
with that premise. Lineberry and Fowler (1967)
argue that reformers were especially hostile to the
political machine's attempt to capitalize on community cleavages-class, ethnic, racial, or
religious. Reforms were presumably desired as a
way of insulating municipal governments from
such divisive social forces. One of their basic purposes was to determine if indeed reform governments responded differently from nonreformed
governments to their socioeconomic environment.
Their analysis of tax and expenditure burdens in
cities of 50,000 and over confirms this expectation. Socioeconomic variables were much more
closely associated with taxing and spending in
unreformed than in reformed cities.! But what
about tax and expenditure levels? Contrary to the
public-regarding view, reform cities had lower tax
and expenditure burdens. They infer from this
finding that reformed institutions indeed do maximize the power of the middle class, but that
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group apparently wants less, not more, public
spending.
This finding that reforms produce lower spending commitments is not inconsistent with another
body of thought regarding the goals of municipal
reformers. Hays (1964) contends that the
municipal reform movement was dominated by
the upper class with extensive support from
business organizations. Such groups, who had little need for high-priced social programs, were
primarily interested in having traditional
housekeeping services economically provided.
Business-oriented reformers were also eager to
create a favorable climate for profit-making in the
city, providing another motive for municipal efficiency (Judd, 1979, pp. 111-12). According to this
reasoning, reform structures should lead to lower
levels of taxing and spending, just as Lineberry
and Fowler (1967) and others find (Lyons, 1978).
Finally, some contend that reforms make no
real policy differences. Presumably, both structure and policy are the result of the same antecedent influences, either region (Wolfinger and
Field, 1966; Cole, 1971) or the socioeconomic
characteristics of the community (Hawkins, 1971,
Ch.3).
In sum, despite the provocative publicregarding thesis, most research suggests that
municipal reforms should either reduce taxing or
spending or have little noticeable effect. As indicated above, all these studies, regardless of their
findings, have been cross-sectional in design. Or
at least changes in government structure over time
have not been examined for their possible effect
on policy variations. No attempt has been made
to assess policy changes among cities that have
altered their government institutions. Surely the
debate over the potential policy consequences of
the local political system should not be settled
solely on the basis of cross-sectional findings. We
need to consider what happens to certain
municipal policies over a period of time when a
city changes its basic political structure.

Research Design
lIn fact, Wright (1976) has challenged Lineberry and
Fowler's conclusion, arguing that their research is
flawed because correlation coefficients are used in comparing groups of cities. He insists the proper comparison is between unstandardized regression coefficients.
When Wright further tests the Lineberry and Fowler
thesis using a multiple regression model in which the
slope of each SES variable is allowed to vary within each
category of reform, he finds no support for their position. "None of the SES variables becomes systematically less strongly related to policy outputs as reformism
increases" (p. 369).

We employ a quasi-experimental time-series
design (Campbell and Stanley, 1966; pp. 55-57) to
test the policy effects of municipal reform. Two
groups of cities are required, one in which a
change takes place and a comparable group not
undergoing the experimental change from which
similar "control" time-series data can be
gathered. The design not only controls for virtually all the customarily ldentified threats to internal
validity, but also it readily lends itself to public
policy applications (see Meier, forthcoming).
In this analysis, government structure
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represented by the elements of reform (city
manager, at-large representation, nonpartisan
elections) serves as the independent variable.
Among cities with populations of 25,000 and
above, eight cities were found that changed a completely unreformed structure to a totally reformed
government during a single year between 1948 and
1973. Another three cities were found that began
with all of the reform elements and dropped at
least two of these in a single year. Z Apparently only one city, since 1950, has dropped all three
reform elements in a single year. A second group
of eleven cities, which began with the same form
of government and maintained this structure,
were matched to specific cities in the first group.
Cities that experienced a change in government
structure constitute the "experimental" group
and those cities that did not become the
"control" or "match" group. Table 1 includes
both groups of cities, the year of structural change
for the experimental cities, and the structural
components.
A brief comment should be made regarding the
matching procedure. The following criteria were
employed to select the matching cities: (1) a comparable form of government with the experimental city before the change; (2) similar economic
base; (3) a similarity in one of the dependent variables, per capita general revenue. Matching by
both economic base and per capita general revenue should minimize the possibility that observed
changes in fiscal behavior over time might result
from differing socioeconomic characteristics between the pairs of cities. One additional important
characteristic of our cities should be noted-functional responsibility. Differences in spending assignments among cities must be considered when
expenditures are analyzed. This is particularly
true for schools and welfare, since these two very
expensive activities can account for about half the
variation in total general municipal expenditures
(Liebert, 1974, pp. 771-72). Our experimental and
control cities are perfectly congruent on school
and welfare responsibilities.
The time-series analysis includes an examination of 7 revenue and expenditure variables over
an II-year period-the year of change and 5 years
before and after that intervention. The dependent
variables consist of per capita measures of (1)
general revenue, (2) general expenditures, (3)
police expenditures, (4) fire expenditures, (5)

'Although the decision to treat municipal reforms as
additive is debatable (see Lyons, 1977), Bryant (1976)
has shown that the three customarily used items (with
commission form considered as a reform structure) do
meet the .90 criterion for a Guttman scale using all cities
having populations of 25,000 and over.
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highway expenditures, (6) sanitation expenditures, and (7) parks and recreation expenditures. 3 We would prefer to have additional measures that could be used to assess differences in
spending for social programs, but our fiscal measures represent all such data of any consequence
consistently available from the Census Bureau
over the past several decades.

Findings
Although results of an interrupted time-series
design are often displayed graphically, visual
examination may be inconslusive. Thus it is
necessary to test for the effects of the intervention
statistically. McCain and McCleary (1979) offer a
method for performing an ordinary regression
that estimates the parameters for the initial level
of spending, the slope (spending trend over time),
change in level, and change in slope (both potentially resulting from the intervention). These potential effects can be represented with the following regression equation:

Yt

=al + b 1X lt + b 2 X 2t + b3X 3t + et·

In this equation the independent variable Xlt is
a linear measure of time such that Xlt equals 1,2,
3, ... , N. The parameter b l is the slope of the
series. X 21 is a dummy variable where X 21 = 0
before the reform change and X 21 = 1 after the intervention. The parameter b2 thus represents the
alteration in level (intercept) following reform
change. Variable X 31 is also a dummy "countervariable" where X 31 = 0 before the intervention
and X 31 = Xlt after the intervention (Le., 1, 2, 3
... ). The parameter b3 represents the post-intervention change in slope. If the parameters b2 and
b3 are not statistically significant, 4 we may accept
'Data sources for these variables include U.S. Bureau
of the Census, City Government Finances (1945-1978);
International City Management Association, Municipal
Year Book (1945-1978); and the Rand McNally
Commercial Atlas and Marketing Guide (1945-1978),
which provided estimates of city populations for use in
calculating the per capita measures for non-census periods. Capital outlays have been removed from all expenditures where the data permit, i.e., general expenditures
and highways (capital expenditures could not be excluded, however, for any of the 1940s data). Where the
breakdown was available (since 1960), sanitation expenditures do not include sewerage.
"Although tests of statistical significance are not
strictly applicable to data representing a total population, such tests are commonly employed as a way of depicting "sizable" relationships. Because of the small
number of time points in the analysis and the need to
emphasize changes that are more than minimal, only
those changes in the intercept and slope that reach the
.01 level of significance are reported.
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the I1JJIl hypothesis that reform interventions produced no effect. In the opposite case, if these two
parameters are significant, we must then look for
autocorrelation before we may assume that reforms made a difference. Note that the formula
to be used consists of only the three time-related
variables; no measures of the social and economic
characteristics of the cities are included. Omission

of the usual socioeconomic variables appears
justified for three reasons. Assuming the match is
well done, the pairs of cities should be similar in
certain fundamental ways. Second, as the subsequent analysis will reveal, the level of explained
variance for almost all the equations is so high
that any additional independent variables would
add virtually no explanation. Finally, with an N

Table 1. Experimental and Control Cities, Government Structure and Economic Base
()V = 22)

A. Experimental

Year of.
Change8

Econowic
Base

Government StructureC
After Change
Before Change
MC-M-P
MC-W-P
MC-W-P
MC-M-P
MC-M-P
MC-W-P
MC-W-P
MC-W-P
CM-A-NP
CM-A-NP
CM-A-NP

1. Council Bluffs, Iowa
2. Peoria, illinois
3. Rock Island, lllinois
4. Brockton, Massachusetts
5. Huntington, West Virginia
6. Little Rock, Arkansas
7. Independence, Missouri
8. Great Falls, Montana
9. Worcester, Massachusetts
10. Kenosha, Wisconsin
11. Brockton, Massachusetts

1951
1954
1954
1958
1958
1958
1962
1973
1950
1958
1962

B. Control

Economic
Baseb

Government
Structuree

Rm

MC-M-P
MC-M-P
MC-M-P
MC-W-P
MC-M-P
MC-M-P
MC-W-P
MC-W-P
CM-A-NP
CM-A-NP
CM-A-NP

1. Davenport, Iowa
2. Terre Haute, Indiana
3. Muncie, Indiana
4. Cranston, Rhode Island
5. Hammond, Indiana
6. Charleston, West Virginia
7. Berwyn, lllinois
8. Billings, Montana
9. Hartford, Connecticut
10. Clifton, New Jersey
11. Lowell, Massachusetts

Mr
Mm
Mm
M

Rr
Rr
Rr
M
Mm
Mm

T

Mr
Mm
Mm

Mr
Rm
Rm
Rr
Mm
Mm
Mm

Net
Changed

CM-A-NP
CM-A-NP
CM-A-NP
CM-A-NP
CM-A-NP
CM-A-NP
CM-M-NP
CM-A-NP
MC-W-P
MC-W-NP
MC-M-NP

+3
+3
+3
+3
+3
+3
+3
+3
-3
-2
-2

Source: International City Management Association,Municipal Year Book (1945-1978), Washington, D.C.
aFirst year city altered government structure.
bCities classified according to employment patterns, as follows:
T =Transportation center (25 percent or more reported transportatiun as occupation)
Mm =Manufacturing city (50 percent employed in manufacturing)
Mr =Diversified city (employment in manufacturing dominant but less than 50 percent)
Rr =Retail trade city (retail employment is greater than that in wholesale trade, service, or
manufacturing)
Rm = Diversified city (retail employment dominant, manufacturing employment at least 20 percent)
cForrn of government, representation, and ballot type, as follows:
CM =City manager form
MC =Mayor-council form
A =At-Iarge representation
W = Representation by ward or district
NP = Nonpartisan ballot
P = Partisan ballot
dNumber of reform elements present after change.
eConstant structural arrangements during the period analyzed.

1980

Urban Policy: Does Political Structure Matter?

of 11 (time points), adding more explanatory
variabfes runs the risk of overdetermining the
equation and exhausting the needed degrees of
freedom.
Here we should note that the dependent
variables in the analysis to follow are mean figures
for cities grouped into four categories-more
reformed experimental cities (N = 8), less reformed experimental cities (N = 3), and the two
groups of control cities. This averaging process
permits us to report far fewer equations and has
the additional advantage of smoothing out any
potential abrupt changes in spending peculiar to a
given municipality.s Nonetheless, as an additional
precaution, a separate time-series analysis was
undertaken for each individual city, the results of
which are summarized below.
The results of the initial analysis are found in
Table 2. The regression coefficients are shown for
each variable along with the degree of statistical
significance for each and the level of explained
variance (Rl) for the equation. Our first concern is
to determine how many statistically significant relationships exist for variables 2 (intercept) and 3
(slope). In fact, few significant differences are
found for the two variables. For the total of 28
equations only 9 reflect statistical significance at
the .01 level for either variable 2 or 3. More than
this only 4 of these 9 equations show statistical
significance for those cities undergoing structural
change. Otherwise all significant changes are for
control cities. As with any time series, our results
must also be tested for autocorrelation. If serial
correlation is present, the differences between the
pre-intervention and post-intervention period is
likely to be overstated (Ostrom, 1978, p. 29). We
might thus conclude in our case that reforms
made a difference when in fact they did not. Our
test is made using a procedure developed by Pack
(1977), which is actually the first step in the BoxJenkins (1970) method for identifying autocorrelation. If the Q statistic produced by the test,
shown in Table 2, is not significant (using a chisquare distribution), no autocorrelation exists.'
'With a small number of cases, especially with the
possibility of considerable variation on certain
variables, one might consider standardizing the
variables before averaging. For each city, the per capita
measure for every year was converted to a Z-score for
each of the 7 functional categories. These standardized
values were then used in the time-series analysis described in the text. Only a few changes resulted, which appeared to be so minor that we felt justified in omitting
the standardization procedure and have reported the
data on a per capita basis to make interpretation easier.
'We are greatly indebted to Ken Meier for making
available the computer program necessary to generate
the Q statistic.
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Using the less demanding .05 level, only one of the
nine significant intercepts and slopes reflects autocorrelation. Since the autocorrelation is for a control group, we may safely ignore it; it will not affect our basic hypothesis concerning the impact of
reform structures.
One more basic issue must be addressed at this
point. Four equations involving experimental
cities did contain significant changes apparently
resulting from the intervention. But what about
the direction of change? If the change in spending
is not in the right direction, reform does not produce the expected impact. The results of these
four equations showing the direction of change
for the intercept or slope is as follows (positive
direction means spending increased; negative direction, the opposite): (1) general expenditures for
less reformed cities have a positive slope change;
(2) police spending in more reformed cities shows
a positive intercept change; (3) sanitation spending for more reformed communities manifests a
positive intercept change; and (4) highway expenditures in less reformed municipalities reflect a
positive slope change.
All the changes are positive, indicating more
than expected increases in spending following
structural change. But note that two of the equations-police and sanitation spending-are for
groups of cities that became more reformed.
Those cities, in line with the presumed effect of
reforms, should have spent less after the structural change took place. So, in all, for 28 tests of
the effects of reform, only two structural changes
(7 percent) produce the expected modifications in
revenue and spending levels. Moreover, just as
many significant effects of structural change
among experimental cities are in the wrong direction. These findings clearly do not bode well for
the theoretical assumptions growing out of the reform literature.
The relationship between municipal reforms and
policy changes were tested in three other ways.
First, a time-series analysis was performed for
each city separately (without averaging). Of the 39
significant changes (in intercept or slope) of a
total 156 possible, 16 occurred among experimental cities. But exactly half of these changes
were in the wrong direction. Second, each experimental city was compared directly with its
control counterpart for each of the 7 policies. Of
the 11 cases where an experimental city reflected a
change that was not found in its control, 6 were in
the wrong direction. Finally, changes in spending
patterns among the functional areas were examined by calculating the percentage of general expenditures devoted to each of four spending categories. These data were then employed as dependent variables in a similar time-series analysis. In
only two equations did statistically significant var-

.,
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Table 2. Regression Coefficients for OLS Equation for All Sets of Cities
to Test for Significance of Change in Reform Structure (Betas in Parentheses)

Dependent Variable
(per capita)

Time

Independent Variables
F· Intervention F· Intervention F·
Value Intercept Value
Slope
Value

R2

Pack's

Q*

General Revenue
More Reform (N = 8)
Control (N = 8)
Less Reform (N = 3)
Control (N = 3)

4.09
( .86)
3.95
(1.00)
6.37
(1.09)
8.85
(1.30)

<.01
<.01
<.01
<.01

4.28
( .14)
5.32
( .21)
-1.40
(-.04)
-8.37
(-.19)

ns

<.01
ns
ns

.00
( .00)
-1.60
(-.23)
-.84
(-.08)
-2.07
(-.17)

ns

.98

ns

.99

ns

.98

ns

.98

ns

.97

ns

.99

8.84**

<.01

.99

4.51

ns

.98

ns

.99

2.58

ns

.99

3.48

ns

.97

ns

.98

ns

.91

ns

.98

ns

.88

<.01

.97

1.63

-.84
(-.40)
1.82
( .75)
.25
( .18)
-.36
(-.30)

ns

.84

3.37

ns

.81

ns

.55

ns

.74

.49
( .69)
-.57
(-1.02)
.05
( .11)
-.08
(-.17)

ns

.88

ns

.79

ns

.83

ns

.83

4.34

General Expenditures
More Reform
Control
Less Reform
Control

4.00
( .82)
3.54
( .82)
6.10
( .76)
10.41
(1.05)

<.01
<.01
<.01
<.01

6.46
( .21)
10.20
( .37)
-9.37
(-.18)
1.86
( .03)

ns

<.01
ns
ns

-.22
(-.03)
-1.48
(-.19)
6.08
( .42)
-1.76
(-.10)

Police Expenditures
More Reform
Control
Less Reform
Control

.41
( .64)
.50
( .86)
.36
( .79)
.79
( .98)

<.01
<.01
<.01
<.01

1.10
( .27)
.53
( .14)
-.58
(-.20)
-.87
(-.17)

<.01
<.01
ns
ns

.13
( .12)
.01
( .01)
.32
( .39)
.24
( .17)

Fire Expenditures
More Reform
Control
Less Reform
Control

.62
(1.34)
.48
( .75)
.36
( .81)
.90
(1.12)

<.01
<.01
ns

<.01

-.11
(-.04)
2.01
( .49)
-.43
(-.15)
1.17
( .24)

ns

<.01
ns
ns

-.35
(-.42)
-.27
(-.24)
.22
( .28)
-.63
(-.46)

4.81

Sanitation Expenditures
More Reform
Control
Less Reform
Control
Parks Expenditures
More Reform
Control
Less Reform
Control

.38
( .33)

ns

.72

ns

( .53)
.41
( .54)
1.00
(1.44)
.06
( .16)
.43
0.36)
.22
( .84)
.32
0.23)

ns

<.01

ns
<.01
ns

<.01

7.02
( .95)
-3.53
(-.41)
.21
( .04)
-1.89
(-.43)

<.01

.29
( .11)
.74
( .37)
-.05
(-.03)
-.35
(-.21)

ns

ns
ns

ns

ns
ns
ns

continued
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Table..,2. (continued)
Dependent Variable
(per capita)

Time

Independent Variables
F- Intervention F- Intervention FValue Intercept Value
Slope
Value

R2

Pack's

Q*

Highway Expenditures
More Reform
Control
Less Reform
Control

_64
( _98)
.32
( .97)
-.36
(-1.41)
.37
( .70)

<_01
<.01
<.01
ns

1.80
( .44)
_60
( .29)
.92
( .58)
2.29
( .69)

ns
ns
ns
ns

-_58
(-_50)
-.18
(-.31)
.64
(1.42)
-.48
(-.52)

ns

.92

ns

.92

<.01

.74

ns

.83

3.37

Sources: U.S. Bureau of the Census, City Government Finances (1945-1978); International City Management
Association, Municipal Year Book (1945-1978) (Washington, D.C.); Commercial Atlas and Marketing Guide
(1945-1978) (Chicago: Rand McNally).
*The Q statistic may be compared with a X2 distribution, where a value of 7.815 is necessary for statistical
significance at the .05 level (**). Unless the Q is significant, no autocorrelation is deemed to exist.

iations in slope or intercept appear for experimental cities, and one of these was in the wrong direction. Changing structure does not seem to matter
much in allocating funds across different functional areas.

Conclusion
Disagreement persists over the potential policy
consequences of urban political structures. Most
of the prior attempts to investigate this linkage
have dealt with the question of whether municipal
reforms should induce cities to tax and spend
more or less than unreformed cities. Despite Banfield and Wilson's widely known thesis suggesting
that cities dominated by a middle-class publicregarding ethos may support greater public expenditures, a larger body of research tends to support
the view that reformers wanted efficient, businesslike government with lower levels of spending. To
complicate matters further, others have shown
that reform characteristics have little or no impact
on municipal spending levels. The research reported here, employing an interrupted time-series
design for 22 cities over an ll-year period, generally confirms that changes in city government
structure have almost no impact on changes in
taxing and spending levels. We also discovered no
consistent reallocation of expenditures among
functional categories following changes in municipal structure.
This research represents the first attempt to
analyze the effects of local government structure
on policy using a genuine longitudinal design. If

we accept the argument of Gray (1976) and others
that theoretically policy making should be viewed
as a process occurring over time, we believe our
dynamic model is preferable to a cross-sectional
analysis. Admittedly, this research is not likely to
settle this dispute permanently-our findings are
confined to fiscal variables, the time span is
somewhat limited, and a relatively small number
of cities are involved. Clearly something comparable to this analysis should be undertaken, where
appropriate longitudinal data can be located, for
other policy measures. Given these constraints,
none of which we believe seriously limits what we
have done, the findings are nonetheless unambiguous-urban reforms have few policy consequences.
What might we conclude about the efficacy of
the reform movement based on these findings?
There is a widely shared view that this group was
largely successful in its effort to rid the cities of
pernicious machine influences; presumably
today's municipalities are more honestly governed, more efficient, and better managed than
was true in the past. But the evidence offered here
suggests these changes had little long-range effect
on basic fiscal decisions. If the reformers wanted
to keep the lid on city spending (which in itself is
still arguable), they were not successful. No attempt is made here to minimize the overall import
of the reform movement. Indeed, a number of
community battles have been waged over the
adoption of reform structures. Yet in the long
run, government structure may matter very little-at least when it comes to city taxing and spending policies.
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